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This paper deals with the formulation of a resource extraction tax for a resource that 
is finite yet relatively abundant in its availability. The basis for the formulation is the 
higher extraction costs that are imposed on future generations as a result of present 
extraction. The optimal size of tax is determined by the trade-off between present 
losses and future gains.
1. INTRODUCTION
Any nonrenewable resource is finite in its availability. Theoretical 
frameworks concerning extraction strategies for such resources have relied on the 
premise that: extraction during a given time period would be at the expense of 
resource requirements during subsequent time periods, resulting in inter-temporal 
or inter-generational conflicts, (Hartwick and Olewiler 1986, Thampapillai and Hanf 
1988). Hence resource conservation is recognised as a pertinent objective in 
these frameworks, and the concept of user coosts has been introduced to resolve 
intergenerational conflicts. User costs are defined as the net benefit that is denied 
to a future generation due to extraction for the present generation (Mclnerney 
1976). These user costs, when determined, can be translated into a tax to be 
imposed on present users of the resource, to prompt resource conservation. 
However, with some nonrenewable resources, the size of the resource stock is 
large enough to warrant the relegation of the user cost concept to only long term 
analyses. For example, Brain and Schuyers (1981) illustrate that the size of 
recoverable deposits of coal in Australia would be sufficient for Australia's energy 
requirements for at least 200 years. Resources of this type could be referred to as 
nonrenewable but quasi-infinite. With such energy resources, (for example, coal, 
uranium and oil-shale), although the relevance of the user cost concept is 
theoretically valid, its impact is likely to be negligible in the context of positive 
discount rates.
Although the extraction of the nonrenewable resources that are quasi-infinite 
does not readily present conflicts pertaining to exhaustion, another type of conflict 
arises from their extraction. Given that the resource is embedded in layers beneath 
the ground, the extraction of the initial layers is relatively inexpensive, compared to 
the extraction of the subsequent layers. The increasing cost is a function of not 
merely the depth of the resource layer, but also the quality of the resource ore as 
extraction progresses. For example, the grades of all metalic ores currently in use 
are far below the grades of those exploited in the past. That is, the amount of ore
which has to be moved and processed, in order to obtain a unit of the resource 
increases with extraction. Hence, even if the extraction of these so called quasi­
infinite resources may not deprive future generations of resource availability, their 
present extraction imposes a higher extraction cost on future generations. The 
intergenerational conflict therefore, concerns the possible reduction in future 
welfare due to increases in extraction costs. So, an optimal extraction policy for the 
present time period will be based on an analysis of future costs.
The object of this paper is to illustrate a conceptual framework for the optimal 
extraction of a quasi-infinite resource. The policy instrument considered is a tax on 
present extraction as compensation for the higher extraction costs that are imposed 
on the future generation. The analysis is set in the context of two time periods 
namely a present and a future time period. Given that the tax is based on the costs 
of extraction, these costs are briefly discussed, prior to the illustration of the taxation 
framework.
2. THE MARGINAL COSTS OF RESOURCE EXTRACTION
The usual assumption in economic analyses is that the marginal cost (MC) 
curve is positively sloped in the short run and U-shaped or L-shaped in the long 
run. Hence in long term analyses, production is assumed to occur in the flat portion 
of the L-shaped function or at the minimum of the U-shaped function. Further, in the 
context of oligopolistic and monopolistic situations, production is assumed to occur 
in the decreasing portion of the long run marginal cost (LRMC) function. Such 
assumptions are reasonable in defining the costs of extracting renewable 
resources. This is because, the cost curves of each period may be regarded as 
replicas of one another, at least in a stable economy. However, these assumptions 
are not relevant in the analyses of nonrenewable resource extraction. This is due 
to the fact that with nonrenewable resources, the marginal costs in a given period, 
MCt, are influenced by not only the volume of extraction in that period (Xt), but also 
the total volume of extraction in all preceding periods (X). That is:
MCt = t(Xt, X). (1)
Further, given that the quality of the resource declines with the progression of 
extraction.
3MQ/3X > 0. (2)
Hence, the assumption herein is that the LRMC function for non-renewable 
resources is one that is positively sloped. That is, the costs of extraction increase 
as the volume of extraction increases. In fact, this assumption, which is central to 
the discussion that follows, does not deviate too far from the reality that prevails with 
respect to the extraction of nonrenewable resources.
For purposes of convenience and simplicity, the following assumptions are 
» >  made.
(i) The long run marginal cost of extraction in period t, namely (LRMCt), is a 
linear function and is defined as:
t-1
LRMCt = a + b(Xt) + b I  X t-i (3)
i=1
where Xt is the extraction quantity in period t, and a and b are the intercept 
and the gradient respectively. Hence, the LRMC function for the initial time 
period is:
LRMCo = a + bXo. (4)
(ii) The demand for the resource is also described by a linear function and is 
assumed to remain unchanged during the two time periods. That is:
Pt = c-dX t, (5 ) where c
and d are respectively the intercept and the gradient
(iii) The resource is neither imported nor exported.
(iv) The extraction of the resource does not result in any externalities or external 
effects, with the exception of the higher extraction cost that is imposed on the 
subsequent period.
3. THE DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL TAX
Suppose now that a uniform tax, T, is imposed on extraction during the intitial 
period. The supply function for this period, namely S t,  will hence be a function to 
the left of the LRMC as shown in Figure 1. Sinced the tax is uniform, S t  can be 
defined as:
ST = {(a  + T) + b X 0} (6)
That is, the tax raises the price and reduces the extraction quantity during the 
initial time period. The optimal extraction quantities for the initial time period, with 
and without the tax, namely X ot and Xo. respectively can be defined by the 
equilibrium between the demand and the relevant supply functions. That is:
X o t = (c -a )(b  + d)-i - T (b  + d )-i, (7)
Xo = (c - a)(b + d)"1. (8)
If T > 0, then Xot < Xo- That is introducing a tax T in the initial period, results 
in a lowered level of production. The welfare loss during the initial period due to 
taxation, WLT, is represented by the area of triangle ABC in Figure 1, and can be 
defined as:
WLT = ( Xo - Xot) t | ,  or (9)
using (7) and (8) as:
WLT = ~ T {(c  - a )(b  + d ) - ' - [(c  - a)(b + d )-i - T(b + d ) '1] }  
l- rM b  + d)-' (10)
The marginal welfare loss with respect to the tax is:
dWLT T/K / 1 1 \— dT~ = T (b + d)'1 (11)
This definition of the marginal welfare loss is considered subseqently in formulating 
the optimal tax.
Consider now the next time period, which is illustrated in Figure 2. The 
LRMC of extraction during this period will depend on whether or not a tax had been 
imposed during the initial period. For example, if a tax were not imposed, then a 
larger quantity of the resource would have been extracted during the intial period,
X OT X 0
Figure 1: The effect of a tax on the initial period.
p
Figure 2: The effect of a tax on the second period.
relative to the situation of having a tax during that period. So, the intercept, of the 
LRMC for the subsequent time period would be higher without tax than with a tax. 
Hence in Figure 2, two possible marginal cost functions are shown for the 
subsequent time period, namely:
(i) LRMC - representing extraction costs without tax during the
initial time period, and
(ii) LRMCy - representing extraction costs with a tax during the
intial time period.
However, note that both these functions LRMC and LRMCj are derived from the 
same function, namely that described in (3) above. The difference in their 
intercepts is due to the imposition of a tax during the intital time period. So, the 
distances labelled FC in Figures 1 and 2 are identical, and the two marginal cost 
functions for the second time period can be defined as follows, using (3), (7) and 
(8) as follows.
LRMC = (a + X0b) + bXi (12)
{a + [(c - a) (b + d)'1] b} + bXi 
LRMCj = ( a + X 0Tb) + bXi (13)
{a + [(c - a) (b + d)-i - T(b + d)-i]b} + bXi
The welfare gain during the subseqent time period, WGT, due to taxation in 
the initial period, is represented by the area ABFC in Figure 2. This area consists 
of a parallelogram GBFC and a triangle ABG. Let the area of the parallelogram be 
A-i, which is:
A i = (FC) X-i, where (14)
FC is the difference between the intercepts 
of LRMC and LRMCj; and 
Xi is the extraction quantity in the absence of a tax 
during the intital period.
From (12) and (13) above,
FC = bT (b+ d)‘ 1, and (15)
by equating (5) and (12):
X i = (c - a) (b + d)'1 - b(c - a) (b + d)-2. (16)
Hence,
A i = bT (c - a) (b + d)-2 - b2T (b+d)-3 (c - a). (17)
Let the area of triangle ABG be A2 , and can be defined using (15) above 
as:
A2 = ( x i t -  X1 )  bT(b + d)-1^, where (18)
X-it is the extraction quantity in the presence of a tax 
on extraction during hte initial period.
Since, by equating (5) and (13),
X it  = (c - a) (b + d)-i - b(c - a) (b + d)-2 + bT (b + d)-2 (19)
and (  X 1 t  - X1 )  becomes {bT (b + d)'2}, (18) can be rewritten as:
A2 = 1 b2T2 (b + d) -3 . (20)
Hence the welfare gain during the second time period, WGT, which is (A-t +
A2) can be defined by adding (17) and (20) as:
WGT = bT (c -a ) (b  + d)-2 + ^ b 2 T 2 ( b  + d) -3-b2T(b + d)-3 (21)
From equation (21) it is evident that a welfare gain may occur only if b > 0. Hence, 
we will confine the analysis below to only cases where b > 0.
Now the marginal gain in welfare during the subsequent period with respect to the 
tax during the initial period can be defined as:
dW G T
= b ( c - a ) ( b  + d)-2 + b2T(b + d)-3-b-2(b + d) -3(c-a)  (22)
As can be seen from (22), an increase in tax prompts an increase in the marginal 
welfare gain during the subseqent period. At the same time, however, such an 
increase in tax also causes a welfare loss in the initial period.
A comparison of the marginal welfare loss and gain functions, that is (11) and 
(22) reveals that the slope of (11) is greater than that of (22) as long as:
(b + d) -1 > (b + d) -3 b2 (23a)
This is true for d > 0. Furthermore, the intercept of (11) is zero, whereas the 
intercept of (22) is always larger than zero. That is:
[b(c - a) (b + d)'2] [1 - b(b + d)'1] > 0 (23b)
Hence, the intersection of the marginal loss and marginal gain functions for 
positive values of T will occur, given that b > 0 and d > 0. This intersection, that is, 
the equality between marginal gain and loss, defines the maximization of net 
welfare gain over two time periods. So, given that b > 0 and d > 0, the optimal 
value of the tax for the initial period can be determined by the equality between the 
marginal welfare loss and gain functions. The optimal tax (T*) is:
T* = b (c - a) (d + 2b)'1 (24)
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The following inferences regarding T \  (with respect to the elasticities of the 
demand and supply functions of the resource), can be derived from (24):
(i) if b -»0, then T* 0, and 
if b -> oo, then T* -> (c - a)
(ii) if d —> 0, then T* -> (c - a)^, and
if d —» oo, then T* —» 0; and 
('ii) if (c - a) -»0, then T* ->0.
The first and second conditions derived above indicate that the size of the 
optimal tax tends to be smaller as the demand function becomes more inelastic 
and/or the supply function becomes more elastic. The third condition reveals that 
the optimal value of the tax is directly proportional to the size of (c - a). This has
implications for the formulation of taxes in subsequent time periods, and can be 
explained as follows. Note that (c) is a parameter in the demand function 
representing the willingness to pay for the initial unit of the resource; and (a) is a 
parameter in the LRMC function, representing the per unit cost of extraction of the 
initial uinit. The value of (c) will remain constant over time as the demand function 
is assumed to remain the same. The value of (a) however, increases over time. 
That is, the value of (a) for the subsequent time period because of extraction during 
the initial time period. Hence the value of (c - a) becomes smaller over time. So, if 
a tax policy is formulated for each of the subsequent time periods, in the context of 
the two-period framework outlined above, the optimal value of the tax will become 
progressively smaller.
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